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CURRENT LEGISLATION
"An action, civil or criminal, cannot be maintained
against a reporter, editor, publisher or proprietor of a news-
paper, for the publication therein of a fair and true report of
any judicial, legislative or other public and official proceed-
ings, or for any heading of the report which is a fair and true
head-note of the article published.
This section does not apply to a libel contained in any
other matter added by any person concerned in the publica-
tion; or in the report of anything said or done at the time and
place of the public and official proceedings which was not a
part thereof."
Several significant changes are to be noted in the amended stat-
ute. Of considerable moment is the elimination of the consideration
of the malice that may have motivated the newspaper in making the
report. In actions instituted against newspapers, under the old stat-
ute, there were two distinct questions to be answered by the jury:
1. Was the report fair and accurate? 2. Was the report, though
fair and accurate, published maliciously?
Before it could render a verdict for the plaintiff, the jury was
constrained to answer both questions in the affirmative. Today, how-
ever, it is a complete defense to prove that the publication complained
of is a fair and true report of a judicial or legislative proceeding.
The Legislature also designedly extended the cloak of privilege
to cover fair and true head-notes of the article published.
Newspaper publishers and reporters now enjoy what is tanta-
mount to virtual immunity from civil liability when they publish a
fair and true report of a judicial or legislative proceeding.21 This is
consistent with the trend of the decisions of our courts. If the pro-
ceedings in legislative bodies, and in courts of justice are ever to be
subjected to the wholesome scrutiny of a reading public, then no one
need have occasion to cavil with the granting of these privileges to
newspaper publishers and reporters.
We need have no apprehension that the privilege thus accorded
will lead to utter disregard for the personal security of the individual
by the press. We may assume, and fairly so, that judicial interpreta-
tions of fair and true reports will temper the use of the privilege and
keep it within the bounds of common sense and justice.
FRANK COMPOSTO.
RECEIVERS PENDENTE LITE IN FORECLOSURE ACTIONS.-A re-
ceiver pendente lite is an officer appointed by the court to take
over the possession of property, and to receive the rents and
profits pending the suit. His possession is that of the court, for he is
'
1The Legislature failed to make similar changes in sec. 1345 of the Penal
Law, the corresponding criminal statute.
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an indifferent person and represents neither party. Consequently, his
possession has no effect whatever on the title of the parties to the
controversy, and the benefit of his possession accrues to him who
may be ultimately entitled to the property.1
This equitable remedy was obviously founded upon the lack of a
remedy at the common law, and the courts have been careful to see
that the circumstances of the case were such that an appointment was
to be desired in order to accomplish justice between the parties.2 The
power of appointment, although not arbitrary, lies within the sound
discretion of the court, and should be exercised only when there is
imminent danger of waste, irreparable injury, or loss of security.3
Indeed, the courts have decreed the subject to be one so wholly
within their discretion and control that a covenant in a mortgage
entitling the mortgagee, upon a foreclosure, to the appointment of a
receiver has been held to be a circumstance worthy of consideration,
only when taken in connection with the other attendant facts of the
case. 4 Therein lies our subject, for, in this state, the laws governing
the receivers of pendente lite in actions brought in the Supreme
Court, or in a county court, are materially affected, so far as they
pertain to foreclosure actions, by the adoption of chapter 166 of the
Laws of 1930. This chapter provides as follows:
"Section 1. Section 254 of chapter 52 of the Laws of
1909, entitled, 'An act relating to real property, constituting
chapter 50 of the Consolidated Laws,' as amended by chapter
682 of the Laws of 1917. is hereby amended by adding, after
subdivision 9, a new subdivision to be subdivision 10, to read
as follows :
'10. Mortgagee entitled to appointment of receiver.
A covenant "that the holder of this mortgage, in any
action to foreclose it, shall be entitled to the appointment
of a receiver" must be construed as meaning that the
mortgagee, his heirs, successors, or assigns, in any action
to foreclose the mortgage, shall be entitled, without notice,
'Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (2nd ed., 1919), 3190; Bispham, Principles
of Equity (10th ed., 1922), 868.
'34 Cyc. 18.
3 Tiffany, Real Property (2nd ed., 1920), 2441; Finch v. Flanagan, 208
App. Div. 251, 203 N. Y. Supp. 560 (3rd Dept., 1924), where a covenant
providing for the appointing of a receiver upon foreclosure proceedings being
instituted, and such appointment to be "without notice to the party of the first
part, his heirs, executors or administrators" held not binding upon the succes-
sors or grantees of party of the first part. Receivership subjects person and
property to considerable expense, and deprives him of the use of the property
without justification unless a good cause is shown. "The duty is not assumed
by the court upon the consent of, or for the accommodation of, a person."
' Finch v. Flanagan, supra Note 3; Dazian v. Meyer, 66 App. Div. 575,
73 N. Y. Supp. 328 (lst Dept., 1901); W. I. M. Corporation v. Cipulo, 216
App. Div. 46. 214 N. Y. Supp. 718 (lst Dept., 1926).
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and without regard to adequacy of any security of the
debt, to the appointment of a receiver of the rents and
profits of the premises covered by the mortgage; and the
rents and profits, in the event of any default, or defaults
in paying the principal, interest, taxes, water rents, assess-
ments or premiums of insurance, are assigned to the
holder of the mortgage as further security for the pay-
ment of the indebtedness.'
2. This article shall take effect September 1, 1930."
By subdivision 1 of section 974 of the Civil Practice Act, it is
provided that a receiver in a foreclosure action may be appointed "be-
fore final judgment, on the application of a party who establishes an
apparent right to, or interest in, the property, where it is in the pos-
session of an adverse party, and there is danger that it will be removed
beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or lost, materially injured, or
destroyed." It is under section 974, which regulates the appointment
of receivers pendente lite, that the courts, in the past, have refused to
allow enforcement of a covenant providing for the appointment of a
receiver, if, from the facts, it appeared that the security for the
mortgage had not been impaired. The nev law, it will be noted,
provides that the parties may contract that such receiver may be
appointed regardless of the value of the security.
Let us now consider the effect of the new subdivision upon
section 975 of the Civil Practice Act. This section reads:
"Notice of an application for the appointment of a re-
ceiver in an action, before judgment therein, must be given to
the adverse party, unless he has failed to appear in the action
and the time limited for his appearance has expired. But
where an order has been made directing the service of the
summons upon a defendant by publication, the court, in its
discretion, may appoint a temporary receiver, to receive and
preserve the property, without notice, or upon a notice given
by publication or otherwise, as may be proper. But where the
action is for the foreclosure of a mortgage, which mortgage
provides that a receiver may be appointed without notice,
notice shall not be required."
Our interest in this section deals with the matter of notice. The
words of the last sentence are clear, and no case attracts our attention
wherein the court has not applied their true meaning. But a refer-
ence to the new legislation shows that the words "without notice" in
the last sentence of section 975 of the Civil Practice Act are now
without significance, for the new enactment states that the covenant
in the mortgage consenting to the appointment of a receiver is to be
so construed that such receiver may be appointed without notice.
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The case of Jarmulowsky v. Rosenbloom 5 seems to contain all
the facts necessary for a determination of the exact changes effected
by the addition to section 254 of the Real Property Law. In that
case, an action had been brought to foreclose a mortgage which con-
tained the following clause: "That the holder of this mortgage in any
action to foreclose it shall be entitled, without regard to the adequacy
of any security for the debt, to the appointment of a receiver of the
rents and profits of said premises; and said rents and profits are
hereby, in the event of any default or defaults in paying said princi-
pal, installment or interest, assigned to the holder of this mortgage
as further security for the payment of said indebtedness." The
Court had appointed a receiver pandente lite, and the defendant ap-
pealed from an order denying a motion to vacate the order appointing
the receiver. The Appellate Division, in reversing the judgment, held
that "the mortgage at bar did not provide that a receiver might be
appointed without notice. Furthermore, this record does not disclose
any affidavit among the papers upon which the order was granted
showing the value of the property, or that there was any likelihood
that it did not furnish sufficient security for the mortgage debt."
Today, the covenant providing for the appointment of the receiver
would be enforced regardless of the fact that nothing was said as to
notice, and also regardless of the fact that the security for the mort-
gage debt was not in danger of being impaired or destroyed.
The result of this legislation is, no doubt, eagerly awaited. Most
of the mortgages up to the present time have contained agreements
providing for the appointment of a receiver without notice in case of
default, and, consequently, practically all of the cases in the books
have dealt with appeals from ex parte orders appointing such cus-
todians under the authority given by the last sentence of section 975
of the Civil Practice Act. Many of the orders have been reversed on
the ground that the supporting affidavits did not furnish requisite
proof that the security was in danger; but this result was obtained
only after much waste of time and expense to both parties. The
contentions of both parties have usually been supported by the opin-
ions of property experts, which, needless to say, varied greatly, and
did not form a very good basis upon which to render a just decision.
The new law will not affect those mortgages which do not con-
tain a receivership clause, but it will abolish appeals such as those
mentioned above, in cases where there is such a provision. Where
the agreement exists, the appointment of the receiver may be made
ex parte. The order will not be reviewable on the ground that there
has been no failure of security, for the court has been deposed of its
discretion. What the result will be may not have been anticipated by
the mortgagor; and, yet, it will be merely the consequence of the
enforcement of a contract to which he was a party. Litigation, un-
'Jarmulowsky v. Rosenbloom, 125 App. Div. 542, 109 N. Y. Supp. 968
(1st Dept., 1908).
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questionably, will be diminished, but, on the other hand, property,
the value of which is many times greater than the mortgage debt,
may find its way into the hands of a receiver, to be held by him until
the foreclosure sale is had, provided the parties before that time do
not reach an agreement. The rights of tenants may become involved,
and the credit of the mortgagor seriously, although perhaps unduly,
affected.
BERNARD E. DOCHERTY.
